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REPUTATIONAL SPILLOVERS: EVIDENCE FROM FRENCH ARCHITECTURE 
 
ABSTRACT 
While the notion of reputation has attracted much scholarly interest, few studies have 
addressed the strategic issue of reputational multiplicity and managing the interactions among 
different types of reputations. We suggest that an organization can have several stakeholder-
specific reputations – peer, market, and expert – and that reputational spillover effects (the 
continued influence of one reputation on another) matter at the organizational level. We test 
reputational spillovers on 42 French architecture companies over a period of 30 years. Our 
results show that over time, the three reputations interact with each other, generating positive 
spillovers, with the exception of market and expert reputations. We contribute by explaining 
how interconnected organizational reputations among different stakeholders can interact over 
time, how companies can strategically manage reputational spillovers, and how such 
spillovers influence organizations in creative and professional industries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholarly work on reputation has significantly expanded our understanding of reputation as a 
strategic asset to enable higher performance, provide competitive advantage, and allow 
stakeholders to make inferences about an organization, especially in the absence of more 
specific information about its characteristics and behaviors (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; 
Podolny, 1993). While recent studies have examined how reputation judgments and 
assessments are formed (e.g., Bitektine, 2010; Love and Kraatz, 2009; Mishina, Block, and 
Mannor, 2012; Tost, 2011), we still need a better understanding of the multi-faceted nature of 
reputation, how an organization may have different types of reputation and how these 
different types of reputation may interact over time. 
 
Mishina and colleagues (2012: 460) define reputation as “the collective stakeholder group-
specific assessment regarding an organization’s capability to create value based on its 
characteristics and qualities.” Reputation is often conceptualized as a unitary construct, where 
an organization has one overall reputation (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever, 
2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). It is also considered to be multidimensional – i.e., 
composed of and affected by various characteristics and actions of the firm, such as financial 
performance and socially responsible behavior (Fombrun et al., 2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988). However, reputation also may vary in 
terms of how different stakeholder groups perceive and value it (Carter and Deephouse, 1999; 
Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton, 1997; Mishina et al., 2012). For example, Walmart’s 
reputation with customers and investors has historically been starkly different from its 
reputation with employees and local communities (Carter and Deephouse, 1999). While a 
company can have multiple stakeholder-specific reputations, previous studies have fallen 
short on explaining how such multiple reputations can co-exist and influence each other over 
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time. To what extent do these reputations influence each other? To what extent are they 
complementary or conflicting?  
 
We build on previous arguments about multiple reputations (Carter and Deephouse, 1999; 
Dollinger et al., 1997; Mishina et al., 2012) to study reputational spillovers. In line with 
previous studies of spillovers such as those of knowledge (e.g., Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang, 
2010; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998), we define spillovers as positive or negative 
externalities of resources, activities, or processes that affect parties or entities not directly 
involved. Considering that reputation is a key intangible resource, reputation spillovers are 
positive or negative externalities arising from one stakeholder-specific reputation influencing 
another stakeholder-specific reputation. Studying the impact of reputational spillovers can 
provide an enhanced understanding of how companies manage various forms of reputations, 
deal with a plurality of stakeholders to minimize reputational gaps (Davies, Chun, and 
Kamins, 2010) over time, and navigate reputational complexity and dynamism (Barnett and 
Pollock, 2012; Lange, Lee, and Dai, 2011). 
 
We develop and test a theoretical model of the connections among different kinds of 
reputations. To do so, we complement reputation studies with selection-system studies (e.g., 
Wijnberg, 2004; Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000), which analyze organizational reputation from 
the perspective of stakeholders’ evaluations. Specifically, even if these studies are more 
concerned with competitive processes around an evaluation process, they reveal that an 
organization can have at least three stakeholder-related reputations; peer (reputation with 
other producers in the industry), market (with potential customers), and expert (with critics or 
social judgment providers – neither producers nor consumers). This is particularly relevant to 
creative industries such as art, movie, music, and architecture (Alvarez, Mazza, Pedersen 
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Strandgaard, and Svejenova, 2005; Svejenova, 2005). Drawing on these insights, we 
empirically investigate the spillovers between peer, market, and expert reputations of 
companies in the context of contemporary French architecture. To test these spillovers 
longitudinally, we elaborate a simultaneous-equations econometric model of reputation, based 
on panel-data observations. 
 
We found that over time, the three reputations interact with each other, generating positive 
spillovers, with the exception of market and expert reputations. Specifically, peer reputation is 
pivotal, spilling over on both market and expert reputations. Experts select among those 
architects that enjoy peer recognition, represent avant-gardism, and make their work and their 
name known more widely. Market reputation, which is based on commercial considerations, 
generates negative spillovers on expert reputation, as experts tend to value distinctiveness and 
creativity more than they value commercial success. 
 
Based on these findings, we extend research on organizational reputations by providing 
several insights into reputational complexity and dynamism over time, answering recent calls 
for further research (Barnett and Pollock, 2012; Lange et al., 2011). First, while previous 
studies have addressed the co-existence of different reputations with different stakeholders 
(Carter and Deephouse, 1999; Dollinger et al., 1997; Mishina et al., 2012), we discuss the 
interactions among the different stakeholder-specific reputations and the conditions under 
which they can happen. Second, we complement studies of reputation multiplicity (e.g., 
Dollinger et al., 1997; Lange et al., 2011; Mishina et al., 2012) by suggesting how companies 
can strategically manage such reputational spillovers by presenting a two-way reinforcing 
approach, at the organizational and institutional levels. Third, we provide insights into how 
reputational spillovers influence organizations in creative and professional industries (Cooper, 
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Hinings, Greenwood, and Brown, 1996; Jones and Livne-Tarandach, 2008), and explain how 
reputational spillovers may have different dynamics, depending on the nature of the industry. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Perspectives on reputation 
Organizational reputation is defined as the “stakeholder-specific assessment regarding an 
organization’s capability to create value” (Mishina et al., 2012: 460). As such, reputation can 
be conferred by several stakeholder profiles, such as analysts (Zuckerman, 1999) or critics 
(Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003). Also, depending on the profile of the stakeholder group, 
reputation may significantly vary (Carter and Deephouse, 1999; Dollinger et al., 1997). This 
is because each stakeholder group has its own way and criteria of assessing and conveying 
information about an organization, so that one type of reputation corresponds to a particular 
stakeholder. Indeed, recent work has called for more attention not only to the multi-
dimensionality but also to the multiplicity of reputational forms (Fombrun and Van Riel, 
2003; Lange et al., 2011; Rindova, William, and Petkova, 2005; Mishina et al., 2012). Carter 
and Deephouse (1999) explained how Wal-Mart is known to be tough among suppliers and to 
be efficient and capable among customers and investors. Lange and colleagues (2011: 155) 
distinguished among “being known (generalized awareness or visibility of the firm; 
prominence of the firm in the collective perception), being known for something (perceived 
predictability of organizational outcomes and behavior relevant to specific stakeholder 
interests), and generalized favorability (perceptions or judgments of the overall organization 
as good, attractive, and appropriate).” Similarly, Mishina and colleagues (2012) suggested 
that stakeholders make two primary types of reputational assessment when evaluating a target 
organization, drawing distinctions between the favorability of an organization’s capabilities 
(capability reputation) and that of its character (character reputation). Thus, rather than 
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considering the multiple (positive or negative) dimensions of a unitary overall reputation, 
these studies recognize the existence of multiple forms of reputation, depending on the 
particular stakeholders involved. 
 
While these studies have addressed the multiplicity of reputational forms, we argue that the 
dynamics of such multiplicity are still relatively poorly understood. In particular, we know 
little about the possible interrelationships among the different types of reputation in pluralistic 
environments. For instance, Carter and Deephouse’s study of Wal-Mart (1999) gives no clue 
about if and how a change in Wal-Mart’s tough reputation among its suppliers might affect its 
positive reputation among customers and investors. Are there spillover effects among the 
various types of reputation at the organizational level? Do the various types of reputation 
undermine or nourish each other over time? 
To refine the knowledge of stakeholder-specific reputations, we draw on selection-system 
studies as a theoretical instrument to complement reputation studies. 
 
Perspectives on selection system 
Selection-system studies deal with how selectors assess organizations and choose particular 
ones – the selected – that stand out over time (i.e., increase or maintain their reputations). 
Even if the main focus of this theoretical approach is not on reputations per se, it provides 
insights into how organizations can have multiple reputations by examining who shapes 
value, and how, during competitive processes in pluralistic environments (Gemser, Leenders, 
and Wijnberg, 2008; Mol and Wijnberg, 2011; Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000). 
 
While the literature on reputation acknowledges that each stakeholder confers a certain type 
of reputation (Carter and Deephouse, 1999; Dollinger et al., 1997; Mishina et al., 2012), the 
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selection-system approach highlights three clear-cut profiles of selectors among whom to 
develop a reputation; peer (when selectors and selected belong to the same group or industry, 
and when selectors are other industry producers, such as in academia); market (when selectors 
are customers, while selected are industry producers, such as in everyday products in 
supermarkets); and expert (neither producers nor consumers – when selectors have acquired 
expertise in a given domain, such as professional critics) (Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000). These 
stakeholders may use different and distinct signals of value to assess the quality of an 
organization. We therefore build on the idea that one kind of stakeholder confers one kind of 
reputation; peers confer peer reputation, clients or consumers confer market reputation, and 
critics confer expert reputation. 
 
Peer reputation corresponds to the specific assessment by organizations of the same domain 
(i.e., fellow producers) regarding an organization’s capability to create value for their domain 
of activity. For this audience, the term value refers to improvements of ideas, conceptual 
approaches, and materials within their domain of activity, pushing forward its boundaries. 
This perception reflects a sign of excellence in a particular domain. For instance, Ebbers and 
Wijnberg’s study of nascent ventures in the movie industry suggests that a movie director’s 
peer reputation for the quality and diversity of movie productions is attributed through fellow 
producers or directors (2011). This means that peers are aware of each other’s works 
(Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000) and of belonging to the same social group, which confers a 
degree of coherence in the roles and goals. 
 
Market reputation corresponds to the specific assessment by clients regarding an 
organization’s capability to create value, i.e., to satisfy clients’ expectations. In this 
stakeholder group, the term value reflects the satisfaction of people or companies buying the 
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work. For instance, in the movie industry, box-office success in terms of ticket sales of a 
dedicated movie can represent value for investors giving money to a particular movie 
production firm (Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2011). As such, market reputation is based on general 
trustworthiness: Organizations have to show their ability to deliver on clients’ expectations 
(Becker, 1997; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). 
 
Expert reputation refers to the specific assessment by cultural critics regarding an 
organization’s capability to create value for society in general. Experts are neither peers nor 
clients, but have expertise in the field, and a distinctive ability to disseminate knowledge and 
valued opinions (Mol and Wijnberg, 2011). Such knowledge often originates from their 
training and social background, often complemented by journalism. Thus, experts usually take 
the form of journalists and critics. Their main activities are to identify organizations and to 
use classification systems to assess and position them in relation both to other organizations 
and in a historical sequence (Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000). They promote in broader society 
the works of certain organizations that they see as impactful. This is done mostly through 
articles in the mass media, events, or conversations about culture and intellectual society. For 
example, in the movie industry, because such organizations provide works both that are 
relevant to this domain of activity and that can make society think and react, expert reputation 
of movie directors is based on film critics’ reviews in mass newspapers that inform and guide 
the general public (Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2011). 
 
As such, we see that the three types of reputation are based on different signals of value. 
Understanding the complex relationship among them can provide important insights.  
Moreover, selection-system theory has often been applied in cultural and creative sectors. 
Creative industries supply “goods and services that we broadly associate with cultural, artistic 
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or simply entertainment value” (Caves, 2000: 1). In industries such as visual arts, performing 
arts, design, and architecture (Alvarez et al., 2005), organizations are engaged in conceiving, 
developing, and distributing artifacts and experiences with aesthetic properties and symbolic 
functions, where novelty and differentiation are crucial in shaping recognition and value 
(Jones, Anand, and Alvarez, 2005; Svejenova, Planellas, and Vives, 2010). Because creative 
organizations are known to produce singular and unique artifacts, marked by their signature 
and authorship, reputation issues target not only their products but also the organizations 
themselves. Indeed, the novelty and uniqueness of an artifact enhances the organization’s 
reputation, which is often a key to success. These industries therefore present sites of potential 
reputational spillover on which we build to develop our core arguments. For instance, in 
visual arts, organizations first need to acquire reputation among their peers in order to be able 
to achieve broad recognition among the general public; this takes time, sometimes even 
several decades (Lang and Lang, 1988). In such cases, peers can be seen as parties who need 
to be satisfied so that creative organizations’ contributions can continue to be more widely 
recognized. 
 
Finally, in order to inform the debate on stakeholder-specific reputations, we draw in 
particular on Ebbers and Wijnberg’s study of reputation in the Dutch movie industry (2011). 
Indeed, selectors can be considered as stakeholders in the sense that they both evaluate and 
promote organizations in a given industry – considered as a competitive arena. Moreover, like 
selectors, each stakeholder group has its own specific evaluation process. While the notions of 
stakeholders and selectors may not be completely synonymous, our focus on reputational 
issues enables us to connect them in developing our theory. 
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This theoretical linkage reveals that multiple reputations may go in different directions. Our 
goal is therefore to untangle the complexity of how various stakeholder-specific reputations 
emerge and possibly co-exist over time. To do this, it is necessary to shed further light on the 
interactions between various stakeholder-related reputations. Using selection-system and 
creative-industries studies as theoretical levers to extend the reputation debate, we study the 
interactions among the various forms of reputation. 
 
Reputational spillovers – hypotheses development 
A key motivation of our hypotheses development stems from the notion of reputation 
commons – one company’s vilified reputation can damage other companies’ reputation in the 
industry (King, Lenox, and Barnett, 2002), and vice versa. Applied to the organizational level, 
a vilified/glorified reputation with one stakeholder may negatively/positively influence 
reputations among other stakeholders.  
 
Peers and market reputational spillovers 
Interactions between peers and clients may originate from several sources, such as critics’ 
writings, television shows, and (more directly) artwork commissions – when a client 
commissions a particular work or project. Several scholars have noted that creative 
organizations positively influence the market’s judgments about a peer. In their study of 
awards in the film industry (2008), Gemser and colleagues showed that peers and end-
consumers nourish each other’s perceptions. The reputation that organizations attribute to 
their peers is often also valued by clients. Likewise, in visual arts, Galenson (2005) argued 
that the best advice for a dealer or collector about which artwork to buy comes from painters 
themselves, suggesting that the more one is reputed among peers, the more reputed one will 
be among clients. Drawing on these studies, we can infer that peers act as prescribers for the 
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market. Through their artistic qualifications, they are able to guide clients who may not know 
which organizations to select for their projects, or whose artworks to exhibit or buy. We infer 
that such guidance, albeit indirect, can influence the market’s perception of an organization. 
We therefore hypothesize: 
 (H1a): Peer reputation positively impacts market reputation. 
 
Market reputation may influence peer reputation. Some studies view the symbolic and 
economic sides of creative sectors as oppositional (Eikhof and Haunschild, 2006; Heinich, 
1991; Lampel, 2000). Creative organizations may deliberately negate the economic side of 
art, especially when they have to produce goods to meet a client’s commercial demands. As 
evident in the history of architecture itself (Thornton, Jones and Kury, 2005), this apparent 
conflict between aesthetics and efficiency raises the issue of a potential lack of freedom and 
avant-gardism, since the client may not understand a highly aesthetic avant-garde work and 
may therefore prefer less novelty in creative works. As Caves (2000) argued in his study of 
contracts between arts and commerce, if the dealer hires the actor to paint what the former 
thinks will sell, creative autonomy clearly seems diminished. Even if this view may have 
declined lately, and the absence of economic and commercial incentives may be 
counterproductive, the idea is still present in actors’ minds and in perceptions of what art is 
fundamentally about. For instance, architecture companies that meet a client’s needs without 
suggesting innovative designs or a new concept for the building may not be held in high 
esteem by other architects. The project may be assessed as yet another building driven by 
commercial goals, and be less likely to be remembered by the profession. In addition, creative 
organizations may discount the market philosophy, in that there may be some strategic or 
political moves behind the purchase of creative goods. For instance, presidents and city 
mayors may base their decisions to commission or buy a building more on the desire to 
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promote their country, city, or own name than on the merits of the building or that of the 
architecture company. We thus hypothesize: 
(H1b): Market reputation negatively impacts peer reputation. 
 
Market and expert reputational spillovers 
Concerning the potential spillover effects between market and expert reputations, some 
studies noted that the two can complement each other over time (Bowness, 1990; Lang and 
Lang, 1988; Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000). Such interactions are possible, sometimes 
indirectly, when clients read experts’ written commentaries, or signal their choice about who 
to hire for a project or a piece of artwork. They can also directly meet at social events, such as 
gala dinners and awards ceremonies, to which both groups may be regularly invited.  
 
In terms of how the market may influence experts, Bowness (1990) – in his study of modern 
art – argued that critics cannot be aware of organizations that have never sold anything, and 
that have never received any financial support from clients. Reputation with cultural elites 
seems to be based on concrete evidence of ability, and reputation previously established with 
clients. He therefore suggested that critics are similar to art dealers and buyers in this respect. 
Similarly, Moulin (1967), in her studies of French painters, highlighted that experts become 
reflective critics when explaining and promoting clients’ decisions to invest in works of art, 
and leverage what the market values in order to identify and promote organizations. Drawing 
on these ideas, we infer that such interactions with the market may influence the way in which 
experts develop their own views about organizations. We therefore hypothesize: 
(H2a): Market reputation positively impacts expert reputation. 
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Referring to how the expert stakeholder influences the market, Becker (1982) highlighted that 
cultural intermediaries or critics guide potential clients toward organizations through their 
commentaries and writings. In their study of Impressionism, Wijnberg and Gemser (2000) 
explained the success of Impressionists through the rise of experts who both assisted art 
dealers in choosing whose work to invest in and convinced buyers about the value of art. 
Moreover, Lang and Lang demonstrated that critics and their promotion of organizations 
attract not only those seeking to invest in art but also those seeking to increase their image as 
collectors (1988). We therefore hypothesize: 
(H2b): Expert reputation positively impacts market reputation. 
 
Peer and expert reputational spillovers  
Experts interpret, popularize, and promote artistic works. Interactions between peers and 
experts are based on experts’ articles, meetings, and social events dedicated to art, awards 
ceremonies, festivals (national or international), and periodic events (such as the Venice 
Biennale), where producers and experts meet. 
 
Previous research has argued that having a high reputation with peers generates positive 
spillovers with experts, who aim to discover innovators and the avant-garde. Bowness’s 
(1990) model suggests that being reputed among peers improves one’s chances of becoming 
highly recognized among critics, as peers’ validation echoes the producers’ professional 
ability to innovate. Likewise, Wijnberg and Gemser, in their study of Impressionism, show 
that there is a “symbiotic relationship” between organizations that pursue distinctiveness and 
experts who can help establish its value (2000: 324). Finally, Galenson (2005) suggested that 
the opinions of peers can positively affect those of experts. Organizations that are highly 
reputed among peers are more likely to be promoted and remembered by the wider public 
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than those less reputed among peers; they therefore value experts’ work. Indeed, experts 
themselves have their own reputation to take care of, and promoting a well-known 
organization may help their own reputation to increase. The aura of the producer may thus 
benefit the promoter (Moulin, 1967). Such interactions can influence the way in which experts 
judge producers. We therefore hypothesize: 
(H3a): Peer reputation positively impacts expert reputation. 
 
On the contrary, several studies have highlighted experts’ negative influence over how 
producers are perceived. Several studies dedicated to the cultural and creative sectors note 
that being too visible outside their close circle of peers can damage organizations’ ability to 
innovate – as an attestation of their conformance to norms and a lack of creativity (Heinich, 
1991, 2004; White and White, 1965). Indeed, in order to be known by experts, organizations 
need to be clearly identifiable, and to be able to reproduce what they have done before to 
become trustworthy and reliable. However, this may hurt creativity and the reputation among 
peers. As a consequence, being highly connected to and promoted by experts may negatively 
influence organizations’ ability to innovate, and damage peer perception of their talent over 
time. Also, an expert’s positive perception of organizations can help those who already enjoy 
peer recognition to expand their renown over time, easing their way to posterity (i.e., going 
beyond their lifetimes) – for instance, by cataloging their works (Lang and Lang, 1988). 
Despite this potential long-term gain brought about by expert reputation, high reputation 
outside their circles of peers (i.e., among experts) can damage peers’ perceptions of producers 
in the short term. We therefore hypothesize: 
(H3b): Expert reputation negatively impacts peer reputation. 
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We now present our empirical testing of the spillover effects over time among the various 
types of reputation. 
 
METHOD 
Context and sample 
Architecture is the art of creating and constructing spaces or buildings, be they public 
(housing, religious and state-owned buildings, equipment such as bridges or aqueducts, cities, 
and neighborhoods) or private (headquarters, offices, production sites, etc.). Architecture is 
not simply about the architecture companies’ ability to create work that is functional, 
beautiful (Champy, 2001), and avant-garde (Guillen, 1997); it serves a symbolic and 
commercial function (Jones et al., 2005; Jones, Maoret, Massa, and Svejenova, 2011). 
Therefore, architecture companies manage to combine art, market, and recognition. Indeed, 
architecture corresponds to art on demand, which happens when a commissioner requests an 
artwork or a creative solution to meet particular needs. In the same vein, architecture 
companies submit an architectural proposal to create or renovate a building for a public or 
private client. This shows that recognition is a prerequisite to receiving requests for specific 
works. In line with our theoretical approach, we selected architecture as an empirical field of 
study. It is an example of pluralistic and creative industry (Alvarez et al., 2005), where 
reputational issues are a major concern for architecture companies, in addition to the 
reputation of their artifacts. These companies may face several and potentially conflicting 
reputations. 
 
Architecture companies need to be known to carry out their work, and often aspire to express 
their own vision of space within society. Differentiation and avant-gardism are key attributes 
for architects, and aesthetic properties and symbolic functions – in addition to functionality – 
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are highly valued. They also have to deal with experts who may value their work and ideas by 
writing and talking about them. 
 
We restricted our study population to French architecture, in order to avoid cross-cultural 
issues arising from audience heterogeneity – differences in the cultural knowledge and 
preferences – (Kim and Jensen, 2014) and to provide a coherent context for selection systems. 
Architecture is constrained by nationally distinct mechanisms (Winch and Schneider, 1993), 
creating a national, cultural, and regulatory framework for our study. Nevertheless, 
international (or at least European) rules exist to regulate the activity at a broader level. The 
integration of French architectural practices into European and international standards 
suggests that our study is connected to the global architectural industry. 
 
In order to test our hypotheses and take account of the specific conditions of spillovers in 
answering our research question, we created a sample of contemporary French architecture 
companies using the following criteria. First, we considered companies that had been active in 
the field for more than 30 years between the late 1970s and 2008, in order to trace their 
activities over time. We selected the end of the 1970s as the starting point because this period 
reflected the beginning of new trends in the profession, new reputational issues, and a new 
organization of the selection system. Second, we focused on companies with names 
associated with those of the founder architects, in order to track authorship – a crucial 
reputational element in these domains. Third, we kept in our sample only those for which 
relevant information about reputation was available over a 30-year period. 
 
This list comprised 42 contemporary French architecture companies. This sample represents a 
coherent set of organizations with various reputations, and potential spillovers among these 
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reputations over time. Building a sample from scratch could represent selection bias, as we 
purposefully chose companies that had been active for over 30 years. However, our aim was 
to examine not organizational survival or performance per se, but rather reputational 
spillovers. In this sense, our sample is appropriate for addressing our research questions. 
 
Data collection 
We tracked the trajectory of each of our sample organizations from 1978 to 2008. Year by 
year, we traced their activity and how peers, clients, and experts perceived them, through the 
sample companies’ websites. We complemented this data collection with information from 
books, general websites about architecture, the French architectural press, and the mass 
media. We also collected data concerning the founder architects’ lives through their CVs, and 
data about the industry, such as the growth in the number of French architects and the budget 
allocated to culture (including architecture) by the French Ministry of Culture, an important 
player in the field of architecture since the 1970s. This gave rise to a database encompassing 
31 years of each company’s trajectory and history, including its engagement with various 
stakeholders. 
 
Measures 
Our model tested the connections over time among peer, market, and expert reputations. Our 
choice of indicators was not driven by the conventional metrics of reputation, such as 
rankings, awards, and judgments (Delmestri, Montanari, and Usai, 2005; Pfarrer, Pollock, and 
Rindova, 2010; Rao, 1994). Indeed, contrary to many other domains, architecture has no 
rankings of companies or buildings, and awards are given by multidisciplinary committees 
(and thus cannot be attributed to one stakeholder or another). 
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To operationalize the three types of reputation in architecture, we drew on previous studies 
that have considered media coverage as providing a window through which to study the 
reputation-building process (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova, Petkova, and Kotha, 2007). Indeed, 
journalists inform their stakeholders about the legitimacy and quality of firms and their 
leaders (Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Thus, media dedicated to a particular stakeholder (such 
as professional architectural magazines) can reflect what is seen as legitimate – and so valued 
– in that stakeholder’s eyes. Our archival study made us aware that these articles might not 
cover all the relevant information. We thus drew on press coverage to elaborate the variables 
that would enable us to understand how the different kinds of reputation might interact over 
time. We used a five-year window immediately preceding each year to measure each kind of 
reputation that may be influenced by other reputations. In order to construct reputation 
measures – and not only ones related to visibility – for every stakeholder group, we made sure 
that our sources covered the companies’ capability to create value, as we explain below. 
 
Peer reputation 
Involving one architecture company’s assessment of another’s capability to create value for 
architecture, this reputation was measured by the number of articles dedicated to each 
company’s outputs in the five most-read French architecture journals during the period t−1 
through t−5 years. We selected the magazines AMC Le Moniteur, Technique et Architecture, 
L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, and Architecture Créé as representing the main information-
transmission vehicles for this stakeholder (based on their 2008 circulation figures and their all 
having been created before 1978). We focused our data collection only on newspapers, 
omitting the Internet, since our period of study started before the existence and public use of 
electronic media. The journals included are run by architects who have often become regular 
journalists (such as Jacques-Franck Degioanni, a regular contributor to Le Moniteur, a key 
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weekly journal in architecture), and can thus be considered as examples of peers judging peers 
on quality and avant-gardism for architecture. In line with the selection-system approach, 
considering that experts cannot be producers themselves, architecture magazines in fact 
operationalize peer reputation better than expert reputation. 
 
Two arguments support our choice of journals. First, given that the journals concerned are 
dedicated to architecture, they are likely to closely reflect the preferences of the architects at 
whom they are targeted. Second, since the content of architecture magazines relates to high-
quality projects, focusing on relevant and innovative projects from other architects, these 
contributions also serve to recognize the merit of the selected companies’ outputs. For 
instance, an article dedicated to an architecture company’s work in 2003 is entitled: 
“Innovative concrete: Time for architectural audacity.” Hence, none of the articles identified 
could be considered as reporting on the relevant company or artifact in an unfavorable way. 
 
Market reputation 
This is based on the assessment by its clients of an architecture company’s capability to create 
value for their city (in the case of state authorities) or business (in the case of private 
companies). Here, our stance differs slightly from the traditional selection-system approach. 
We view clients only as public authorities or private companies that purchase creative goods 
for professional reasons (e.g., to develop their activity or to create a new cultural space for 
their city). Following this approach, we measured market reputation by the average number of 
tender invitations that each architecture company received during the period t−1 through t−5 
years. Architecture companies are invited to contests because the client has already heard 
their names from previous works, and because they are judged to be more relevant to the 
client’s project than are their peers. State authorities or public bodies finance more than 70 per 
cent of construction sites (for building or refurbishing schools, museums, and public spaces in 
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general), while other architects’ clients are private companies or individuals, commissioning 
the construction or refurbishment of offices, houses, production facilities, etc. 
 
Expert reputation 
This relates to the critics’ assessment of an architecture company’s capability to create value 
for society. In order to differentiate clearly between expert and market reputation, we again 
take a slightly different stance from the traditional selection-system approach to experts. We 
consider that experts talk to society in general, i.e., to individuals who do not necessarily buy 
creative goods but are in some way connected to them (as the users or viewers of a building, 
for instance). These changes provide a more faithful representation of architecture, in which 
customers may be both purchasers and non-buying users. We measured expert reputation by 
the number of articles (in terms of columns) dedicated to each architecture company of our 
sample in the four most-read mass-media publications, in the period t−1 through t−5 years. In 
line with their circulation figures and their year of creation (prior to 1970), these publications 
were Le Monde, Les Echos, Le Point, and Libération. Again, we omitted the Internet. This 
branch of lifestyle journalism has not evolved greatly since the late 1940s both in France and 
worldwide, with similar articles appearing in publications such as The New Yorker and The 
New York Times in the United States. These publications may prefer to dedicate their time and 
column inches to controversial and interesting topics or people rather than writing negatively 
about architecture. 
 
Control variables  
Because the profession has grown since the 1970s, we argue that the increase in the total 
number of architects in France might affect peer reputation. To operationalize this, we 
reported the total numbers of architects working in France each year. Moreover, we controlled 
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market reputation with the annual budget of the French Ministry for Culture between 1978 
and 2008, on which architecture depends (the clients of the architects under study mostly 
being public authorities). We reported the amount in millions of constant euros on a yearly 
basis. While the data available does not show clearly the budgetary split among the various 
cultural categories over time, it can nevertheless improve the analysis by taking into account 
the variation in the total money spent. Finally, we controlled expert reputation with 
exhibitions, which we measured by counting the number of national and international 
exhibitions to which our sample of architecture companies contributed between 1978 and 
2008, in the period t−1 to t−5 years. Exhibitions could have an impact on expert reputation 
because they provide a visible explanation of companies’ works and views on architecture. 
They may therefore influence opinions, especially those of experts, who may value signs of 
accomplishment at the societal level, or even participate in organizing such events. 
 
We generally controlled our model with several transversal variables. First, in order to control 
for the mixed-profile perspective of value creation among the three stakeholders, we included 
the awards won by the sample architecture companies in our model. Architecture awards are 
given to architects for artworks that are considered superior to other buildings, by a mixed-
profile jury (architects, clients, critics, residents, etc.). We listed and counted all the awards 
that our sample architecture companies received, both national (such as the Grand Prix 
National d’Architecture) and international (such as the Pritzker Prize), in the period t−1 to t−5 
years. Age can also be an important control variable, as it is related to the Matthew effect 
(Merton, 1968) and the winner-takes-all society (Frank and Cook, 1995): The more 
experience and success that one accumulates, the more success that one can then continue to 
attract. The age of each founder architect was calculated for every year. In addition, we 
controlled for sex, which may be relevant to reputation in the male-dominated field of French 
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architecture. The sex of the founder architects was operationalized by 0 for men and 1 for 
women. 
 
We also controlled for the interactions between market and expert reputations, between peer 
and expert reputations, and between peer and market reputations, as there may be cross-
effects between the two for each pair. 
 
Data analysis 
We used an unbalanced panel-data set of 42 architecture companies and 1,117 company-year 
observations, for the sample period 1978–2008. The fact that we built our own database 
provides us with a longitudinal and richer dataset. We set up a simultaneous equations model 
(Greene, 2002), based on a system of three structural equations, to study the relationships 
between peer, market, and expert reputations. Table 1 lists the three structural equations.  
 
----------Insert table 1 here----------- 
 
The equations contain endogenous variables among the explanatory variables and fixed 
effects for each company. Furthermore, these endogenous variables are the dependent 
variables of other equations in the system, meaning that they affect other variables and are, in 
turn, affected by them. In short, there is a two-way – or simultaneous – relationship between 
Y and some of the Xs. It is better to lump together a set of variables that can be determined 
simultaneously by the remaining set of variables – which is precisely what is done in 
simultaneous equation models. In these models, there is an equation for each of the 
mutually/jointly dependent or endogenous variables. And unlike in the single equation 
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models, one may not estimate the parameters of a single equation without taking into account 
information provided by other equations in the system. 
 
The model can be expressed as follows: 
                         
 
for                  and         where  ,    and   denote the cross-section of the 
panel, the time dimension of the panel, and the number of structural equations in the model 
respectively.       is the dependent variable,      represents the company-specific effect,       is 
the matrix for the K explanatory variables (endogenous and exogenous),                is 
the vector of structural equation parameters, and       are the errors (         (     
 )). 
 
As the disturbances are correlated with the endogenous variables, and the error terms among 
the equations are expected to be interdependent, the ordinary least-squares estimation of the 
equations is likely to produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimators. To overcome 
these issues, the three-stage least-squares approach (Greene, 2002) is used to estimate jointly 
an entire system of structural equations. Three-stage least-squares estimation is a three-step 
process. Step 1 develops instrumented values for all endogenous variables. These values can 
be considered as the predicted values resulting from a regression of each endogenous variable 
on all exogenous variables in the system. Step 2 produces a consistent estimate for the 
covariance matrix of the equation disturbances. Finally, step 3 performs a generalized least-
squares estimation using the covariance matrix estimated in step 2, and the instrumented 
values for all endogenous variables, obtained in step 1. Thus, the three-stage least-squares 
procedure can be shown to produce more efficient parameter estimates, because it takes into 
account cross-equation correlations. The architecture company’s reputation model was 
estimated with Stata version12. 
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FINDINGS 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are presented in Table 2. The 
correlation matrix shows that the three forms of reputation are positively correlated with each 
other, and that there is a positive association between these three kinds of reputation and the 
age, awards, number of architects, and budget.  
 
----------Insert table 2 here----------- 
 
We used the variance-inflation-factor (VIF) indicator to check for multicollinearity. As all the 
VIFs are less than the maximum level tolerance (10), we can say that there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity among the model’s explanatory variables. The Appendix provides the details 
of the multicollinearity tests. Results are supported by satisfactory goodness-of-fit levels of 
the regressions (R
2
 values) and the presence of statistically significant coefficients in the three 
equations. Table 3 reports the three-stage least-squares estimates for the peer, market, and 
expert reputation equations. 
 
----------Insert Table 3 here----------- 
 
First, we discuss the results for the hypothesized connections among the three reputations 
over time. Peer reputation generates positive spillovers on market and expert reputation. The 
positive spillover over time of peer reputation on market reputation (β21 = 0.446, p < 0.01) 
means that the more one is reputed among peers, who expect innovativeness, avant-gardism, 
and differentiation, the more one will be reputed among clients, who want aesthetic, 
emblematic buildings to be delivered to the agreed timescale. H1a is confirmed and validates 
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the reinforcement of the market opinion of an architecture company based on what peers 
think. Likewise, there are positive spillover effects of market reputation on peer reputation 
(β11 = 1.956, p < 0.01): The more one is reputed among clients, the more one is reputed 
among architects. This result contradicts H1b. Regarding the relationships between market 
and expert reputations, H2a predicted positive spillover effects of market on expert reputation. 
Our results suggest that there are spillover effects in this case. Confirming H2a, market 
reputation negatively spills over on expert reputation over time (β32 = −3.203, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that experts might not value many commercial successes. On the contrary, our 
results show that expert reputation positively spills over on market reputation over the years 
(β22 = −0.455, p < 0.01), confirming H2b. Finally, regarding the interactions between peer and 
expert reputations, our results confirm that peer reputation positively influences expert 
reputation, confirming H3a (β31 = .490, p < 0.01). The more an architecture company is 
reputed among peers, the more that cultural critics value the company. Likewise, the more the 
critics value a company, the more it is reputed among peers (β12 = .950, p < 0.01), confirming 
H3b. 
 
Second, we discuss the weight of control variables for the three reputations over time. The 
budget for culture, partly spent on architecture, negatively influences the way the market 
perceives architecture companies (β24 = −0.001, p < 0.01). This suggests that clients may 
prefer companies other than those in our sample if they have higher budgets. However, the 
number of architects does not affect peer reputation (β14 = −0.000, p = 0.24), and the number 
of exhibitions does not influence expert reputation (β34 = 0.034, p = 0.65). Awards impact 
both peer (β17 = 1.703, p < 0.01) and market (β27 = −1.053, p < 0.01) reputations, but not in 
the same way. Indeed, the more one is rewarded – be it nationally or internationally – the 
more one becomes reputed among peers, but the less one is valued by clients. This reveals 
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that awards may negatively affect invitations to public and prestigious competitions. Age is an 
important determinant of expert reputation (β35 = 0.306, p < 0.05). Indeed, the more 
experienced a founder architect is, the more the relevant company is valued by experts. It is 
important to put this finding into perspective, with our methodology based on tracking 
architects’ innovative ability over 30 years. Finally, sex has a negative influence on expert 
reputation (β36 = −7.505, p < 0.05), which means that women are less likely to be valued by 
art and cultural critics over time. It strongly echoes the male-dominated nature of the 
profession, apparently reinforced by experts. 
 
Finally, all our interaction variables (peer–market, market–expert, and peer–expert) confirm 
the spillover effects on the three reputations as their associated coefficients are statistically 
significant (β13 = −0.03, p < 0.05; β23 = −0.008, p < 0.05; β33 = 0.084, p < 0.05). For instance, 
the impact of market on peer reputation equals 1.956 when expert reputation equals 0, but 
each time expert reputation increases by 1, the effect of market on peer reputation decreases 
by 0.03. This confirms the importance of interactions among the various stakeholders, as the 
three seem completely interdependent. Figure 1 summarizes these results. 
 
----------Insert Figure 1 here----------- 
 
In summary, our model explains more than 70 per cent of peer reputation, 47 per cent of 
market reputation, and 36 per cent of expert reputation. While this implies that there may be 
other variables (outside our model) that may impact these reputations and their interactions, it 
clearly indicates the presence of spillover effects among the various reputations at stake. 
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As a consequence, our study suggests several combinations relevant to achieving reputation 
with peers, clients, and experts. Our study also shows how each type of reputation is 
influenced by the others, for instance peer reputation is more influenced by market reputation 
than by expert reputation (β12 = 1.956 > β13 = 0.950); the impacts of peer and expert 
reputations on market reputation are almost equal (β21 = 0.446 ≈ β23 = 0.455); and expert 
reputation is positively affected by peer reputation (β31 = 0.490), while negatively affected by 
market reputation (β32 = −3.203). The model thus helps us to understand the complexity of the 
reputational issues by highlighting the interactions among the various stakeholders’ 
reputations involved in a selection system. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our study of the French architecture field explains the linkages among the different 
reputations that an organization may have among different stakeholders. These reputations 
may interact with each other both positively and negatively. For example, in our case, while 
peer reputation reinforces market and expert reputations, market reputation appears to be 
detrimental to expert reputation. Our findings allow us to advance the literature on the 
strategic management of reputation in three ways. 
 
First, while extant work explains how companies interact with different stakeholders and 
build reputations with each of them (Dollinger et al., 1997; Mishina et al., 2012), we 
complement these studies by showing how different types of reputation generate spillovers 
over time. This argument resonates with the notion of “reputational commons” (Barnett and 
Hoffman, 2008), and suggests that spillovers between reputations can occur not just at the 
industry level but also at the organizational level. In line with the literature on resource 
spillovers (e.g. Azoulay et al., 2010), and considering that reputation is a key organizational 
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resource, it is argued that when two or more stakeholder-specific reputations nourish each 
other over time there are positive reputational spillovers, and when two or more stakeholder-
specific reputations undermine each other over time, there are negative reputational spillovers. 
 
In our analysis of architecture companies, the observed spillovers suggest the pivotal role of 
peer and market reputations. While peer reputation is apparently a necessary condition to 
enter and survive in the industry, market reputation seems necessary for initiating a self-
reinforcing process. Market reputation among clients is required not only to generate revenues 
and operate profitably, but also to initiate and sustain positive spillovers with peers that in 
turn can fuel market reputation. Our analysis shows that peer and market’ perceptions of 
architectural “goods” tend to nourish each other, even if each of them has different criteria 
and ways of assessing value (e.g., awards). Likewise, peer and expert reputations also 
positively spill over each other, i.e., nourish each other, over time. However, market and 
expert reputations seem partly to undermine each other, in that market reputation negatively 
spills over on expert reputation. When architecture companies become highly reputable 
among clients, the degree of novelty and avant-gardism tends to decrease, while the experts’ 
role is to identify and promote these criteria of innovativeness.  
 
More broadly, such spillovers can happen in the presence of low reputational “gaps” (Davies 
et al., 2010), i.e., limited differences of perceptions between multiple stakeholders. Otherwise, 
stakeholders may not be able to build on each other’s reputations, and interactions may not 
arise. In our case, reputational gaps do not seem to damage (and may even nourish) 
reputational spillovers, revealing some porosity between peers, clients, and experts. This 
suggests that companies need to tradeoff between being valued for commercial efficiency and 
being valued for avant-gardism. This tradeoff echoes a company’s “strategic balance” 
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(Deephouse, 1999) in responding to different stakeholders’ expectations, and highlights how 
different balances may be needed for addressing different stakeholders. Companies whose 
strategic balance is more focused on being reputed among peers (being considered as avant-
gardists) can be seen as “market-makers” (Pontikes, 2012) – i.e., actors who redefine the 
activity by providing new concepts and visions (such as creating a new genre of architecture – 
e.g., the “environmental perspective,” and green or eco-construction). On the contrary, 
companies whose strategic balance is more focused on being reputed among clients (i.e., 
markets) can be considered to be “market-takers” (Pontikes, 2012), i.e., they prioritize 
responding to commercial demands (such as designing a building in the familiar cultural 
category of “industrial architecture”). In our case, companies seem continually to balance 
their actions between the three stakeholder profiles over time. When architects become highly 
valued by the market, they renew their style and signature to be valued by peers and experts. 
By doing so, and in line with Gemser, Leenders and Wijnberg’s (2008) study showing that 
market and expert evaluations may result in different commercial effects, companies can  
counterbalance the possibly negative spillovers arising from commercial success. This 
suggests the need to continually and temporally manage the complexity arising from being 
able to enhance reputation with one valued stakeholder that may reinforce but also undermine 
the reputation with another valued stakeholder. 
 
Second, through the specific approach of selection-system theory (e.g., Gemser et al., 2008; 
Mol and Wijnberg, 2011), we extend prior knowledge on reputational multiplicity and 
complexity (Barnett and Pollock, 2012; Carter and Deephouse, 1999; Dollinger et al., 1997; 
Lange et al., 2011; Mishina et al., 2012) by providing insights into the strategic management 
of reputational spillovers. Specifically, we suggest that managing reputations strategically can 
be considered to be a two-way reinforcing approach at the organizational and institutional 
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levels. At the organizational level, companies need to strategically manage each stakeholder-
specific reputation (e.g., Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun et al., 2000; 
Rindova et al., 2005; 2007). For this purpose, they can draw on communication mechanisms. 
Indeed, communication facilitates the clarification of expectations and connections between 
the focal company and each stakeholder profile (Kogut, 2000), reducing the uncertainty 
through actions (such as stakeholder-specific communication) that can be managed 
proactively rather than defensively (Combs, Ketchen, Ireland and Webb, 2011). The strategic 
thrust may therefore lie in the stakeholder-specific promotion and communication to 
proactively enhance an organization’s reputation – a key intangible resource. Even if 
organizational resources and capabilities at hand are similar (avant-gardism, for instance), a 
difference of perception can be established through communication strategies tailored to each 
stakeholder profile. Moreover, in line with Deephouse’s study (1999), communication 
strategies may need to be established in a sequential manner, as the various reputations may 
not evolve simultaneously. For example, in the case of architecture companies, expert 
reputation may emerge once the building is finished and can be seen by the wider public, 
while peer and market reputations can be developed as soon as there are calls to commission a 
building. As a consequence, organizations that are highly reputed among peers and clients 
may have to renew and explain their creative journey to experts, who seek to identify and 
value distinctiveness (Bourdieu, 1983; Baudrillard, 1968). As suggested by Rhee and Valdez 
(2009), there may be a need to create new positions within companies for managing 
communication strategies – not at all common for architecture agencies or companies in 
creative industries more generally.  
 
At the institutional level, companies need to navigate the reputational spillovers among 
different stakeholders. This appears to be less in the companies’ hands, as interactions play 
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out among stakeholders themselves. However, these interactions are crucial for companies’ 
institutional strategies, to shape favorably the environment in which they compete for 
resources (Lawrence, 1999). For instance, as experts echo the positive reputation among 
peers, the strategic actions directed at peers may indirectly influence experts’ perceptions. The 
pivotal role of peer reputation exemplifies that companies can collaborate and establish 
strategic alliances with peers and competitors (Dollinger et al., 1997; Stern, Dukerich, and 
Zajac, 2014; Zuckerman, 2014) – in order to gain more positive attention and evaluation from 
clients and experts. The resource-based view (e.g., Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984), posits that 
the “value” of both tangible and intangible resources is determined both endogenously and 
exogenously, i.e., by internal and external stakeholders (Barney, 2001; Lepak, Smith and 
Taylor, 2007). Our study nuances this idea by arguing that different external stakeholders 
(such as peers or critics) may value an organizational resource (such as reputation) differently, 
and that this value is influenced by both collaborative and competitive dynamics (Ansari and 
Munir, 2008).  
 
Third, while our model was developed in the context of architecture, it offers some broader 
implications. While we showed the linkages and spillovers among different stakeholder-
specific reputations for an organization, the nature and degree of spillovers may depend upon 
the field under focus. In visual arts, Wijnberg and Gemser (2000) showed how peers, clients, 
and experts positively influenced each other. Our study of architecture shows that market and 
experts have a more complex relationship: Experts positively influence clients, but not vice 
versa. We suggest that this dynamic many hold more generally in professional services such 
as accounting and law (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood, Li, Prakash, and Deephouse, 2005; 
Jones and Livne-Tarandach, 2008; Von Nordenflycht, 2010), and less so in industries such as 
music, where peers’ assessment is less central. Anyone who aspires to become a musician 
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(and has talent – or luck!) could theoretically become one. On the contrary, to practice a 
profession such as architecture, one needs (although it is a creative profession) a diploma, 
professional expertise, and the acceptance of self-regulated codes, norms, and ethics. 
Professional service companies rely on industry-specific knowledge and expertise, and are 
tightly regulated by professional and/or peer requirements and apprenticeships. As such, 
reputational spillovers may have different dynamics depending on the nature of the industry. 
For instance, our theory development on reputational spillovers may be more relevant for 
sectors such as design, advertising and academia, but relatively less so for industries such as 
music, where peers may be less pivotal. As a consequence, the nature and degree of the 
parameters we developed would need further contextualization. 
 
Our study has several implications for managers. We suggest that a company should not just 
focus on the stakeholder that it believes to be the most strategic, such as clients, but should 
instead value a combination of stakeholders. For instance, a company can invest in building 
relations (and reputation) with peers, and not limit itself just to clients. Indeed, as reputational 
spillovers come with a cost, it may not be enough for firms to focus on an “overall” 
reputation. Managers need to be mindful that the company needs to have reputation in various 
domains, depending on the key stakeholders at stake. Being good for peers may not be the 
same as being good for clients. However, these stakeholders can build on each other over time 
to confer peer and market reputations. Companies can communicate more effectively with the 
market and experts in order to optimize the interactions among them and potentially to 
increase other reputations over time. As suggested by our two-way reinforcing approach of 
managing reputation at both the organizational and the institutional levels, managing this 
balance is complex, as a company may struggle to cope with highly different and at times 
competing signals from different stakeholders (Spence, 1974). However, by engaging with 
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different stakeholders to improve its reputation among them, the company may also benefit 
from interactions among these stakeholders, which may contribute to improving several 
stakeholder-specific reputations. 
 
Our study has several limitations. First, by building on selection-system theory, we focused 
on three types of reputation; peer, market, and expert. Other approaches may provide insights 
into spillovers among other stakeholder-specific reputations, such as those associated with 
employees, shareholders, and suppliers; these may need other literatures to be developed or 
leveraged. Future research may investigate companies’ interactions with other kinds of 
stakeholders, in order to complement and refine our understanding of reputational spillover 
effects and the conditions of their occurrence. In addition, selectors also develop reputations 
pertaining to how well their selection systems work and may attempt to “promote” their 
systems to enhance their reputations. For example, Financial Times competes with other 
selectors for ranking business schools and their reputations vary. Scholars can examine how 
the reputations of different evaluating audiences (selectors) may themselves interact and how 
this may influence the reputations of the organizations they evaluate. Second, our findings 
may have limited transferability to other domains. It would thus be productive to examine the 
extent to which our findings hold in other countries and cultural contexts (Kim and Jensen, 
2014), other creative sectors (such as design, advertising, and luxury businesses), and other 
domains of activity (such as academia). Scholars may also consider industries where rating 
systems exist, such as sports. A third potential limit is our choice not to include electronic 
media in our data collection. A few newspapers – both those dedicated to architecture and 
those not – created websites after the 2000s and may have referenced additional articles about 
our sample of companies. For reasons of longitudinal coherence, we argue that excluding 
these was the best way to proceed. Future research could investigate companies’ electronic 
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coverage in the media and perhaps even on social media, in order to highlight the role of 
electronic media in creating reputations. As electronic sources may be more accessible, it 
would be useful to examine the types of information sources each stakeholder group uses, as 
some may rely on more than one main source (Gemser, Van Oostrum and Leenders, 2007). 
Finally, future studies could examine the relationship between multiple reputations and 
multiple identities. For instance, managers may promote one or several peripheral attributes of 
their identity to a particular stakeholder (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000), but the 
stakeholder may build on different elements of identity (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). 
Likewise, the notions of influencers and influences from the founders’ professional 
background may be important to understanding the intersection between reputation and 
identity. 
 
Despite considerable advances in studies on reputation – a key intangible resource for an 
organization – its complexity calls for further scholarly engagement. By showing that 
spillovers exist among peer, market, and expert reputations over time in French architecture, 
we have provided theoretical and empirical insights into the challenges organizations confront 
in managing different and interacting stakeholder-specific reputations. Our study is an 
important step toward identifying reputational spillovers, showing how these spillovers might 
occur, and their implications for studies of the strategic management of reputation. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Simultaneous equations model 
 
* Endogenous variables 
  
Peer reputation equation Market reputation equation Expert reputation equation 
Market reputation* Peer reputation* Peer reputation* 
Expert reputation* Expert reputation* Market reputation* 
Market x expert Peer x expert Peer x market 
Number of architects Budget (in million €) Exhibitions 
Sex Sex Sex 
Age Age Age 
Awards Awards Awards 
Architect indicator Architect indicator Architect indicator 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
 
 
  
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-0.0054 1.0000-0.0482 0.0298 -0.0187 0.2182* 0.0385 -0.0144
9.Exhibi 
tions
2.214286 4.92427 0 38 0.0292
0.7618* -0.0000 0.1081* 0.8965* 1.0000
8.Budget 
(in million
€)
1500 788.3179 250 2500 0.5044* 0.4587* 0.2974*
0.4502* 0.2859* 0.7452* 0.0000 0.0911* 1.0000
7.Number 
of 
architects
30758.06 7822.409 14500 39500 0.5047*
0.0540 -0.0263 1.00006.Awards .2501967 .6073289 0 4 0.3452* 0.0209 0.2793*
-0.1684* -0.0648 -0.2432* 1.00005.Sex - - 0 1 -0.1064*
1.00004.Age - - 23 76 0.4507* 0.4712* 0.2922*
0.2321* 1.0000
3.Expert 
reputation
5.162826 15.06332 0 267 0.6548*
2.Market 
reputation
4.522273 5.140221 0 41 0.3178* 1.0000
1.Peer 
reputation
11.55223 14.50177 0 92 1.0000
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Table 3: Simultaneous equations model results 
 
* Endogenous variables 
Note: Significant coefficients are in bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value
Peer reputation* - - - 0.446 17.66 0.000 0.490 4.00 0.000
Market reputation* 1.956 12.56 0.000 - - -  --3.203 -7.02 0.000
Expert reputation* 0.950 18.36 0.000 0.455 8.66 0.000 - - -
Market x expert  --0.03 -7.06 0.000 - - - - - -
Number of architects 0.000 1.16 0.247 - - - - - -
Peer x expert - - -  --0.008 -12.11 0.000 - - -
Budget (in million €) - - -  --0.001 -4.31 0.000 - - -
Peer x market - - - - - - 0.084 5.38 0.000
Exhibitions - - - - - - 0.034  --0.45 0.655
Age  --0.101  --1.46 0.144 0.005 0.21 0.835 0.306 3.31 0.001
Sex 1.689 0.68 0.498  --1.367  --1.23 0.219  --7.505  --2.06 0.040
Awards 1.703 2.82 0.005  --1.053  --3.71 0.000  --1.250  --1.60 0.110
R
2 0.7093 0.4710 0.3644
Peer-reputation
equation
Market-reputation
equation
Expert-reputation
equation
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FIGURES 
Figure: Simultaneous equations model results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 The validated hypotheses are in bold. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix: Multicollinearity test 
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